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Abstract
When a ￿rm decides which products to o⁄er or put on display, it takes into
account the products￿ability to attract attention to the brand name as a whole.
Thus, the value of a product to the ￿rm emanates from the consumer demand
it directly meets, as well as the indirect demand it generates for the ￿rms￿other
products. We explore this idea in the context of a stylzed model of competi-
tion between media content providers (broadcast TV channels, internet portals,
newspapers) over consumers with limited attention. We characterize the equi-
librium use of products as attention grabbers and its implications for consumer
conversion, industry pro￿ts and (mostly vertical) product di⁄erentiation.
KEYWORDS: marketing, irrelevant alternatives, limited attention, consider-
ation sets, bounded rationality, preferences over menus, persuasion, conversion
rates, media platforms
1 Introduction
Consumers in the modern market place need to sort through an overwhelming number
of available options, and hence, may not be able to pay serious attention to each and
every feasible alternative. Consequently, some options may receive more attention than
others. This may be due to the fact that some options are better than others along
some salient dimension. For example, when searching for a laptop computer, a very
low price or a very light weight will most likely draw one￿ s attention; when ￿ ipping
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1through TV channels in search of a program to view, one may pay greater attention to
a sensational news report, or to a special guest appearance by a celebrity on a sit-com.
Alternatively, a consumer may pay more serious attention to items that are similar to
options he is already familiar with.
Thus, the mere o⁄ering of a particular item can have an indirect e⁄ect on a ￿rm￿ s
market share by drawing attention to the ￿rm and other items it o⁄ers. For instance,
the items that stores display on their shop front and web retailers put on their home-
pages can exert a positive externality on other items, by persuading consumers to enter
the store/website and browse its selection. Similarly, the shows and news items that a
TV network chooses to broadcast may persuade viewers to stay tuned to that channel
and therefore become exposed to other programmes. As a result, consumers whose
attention is initially attracted to a ￿rm because of a particular item may end up con-
suming another item that it o⁄ers. Firms may take this indirect marketing e⁄ect into
account when designing a ￿product line￿ . Speci￿cally, they may introduce an item
even when the direct demand for this item fails to cover its cost.
This paper explores this motive by proposing a stylized model of market competition
over consumers with limited attention. In our model, ￿rms o⁄er menus of ￿items￿in
response to consumer preferences over such menus. Consumers￿limited attention gives
￿rms an incentive to expand their menu and include ￿pure attention grabbers￿- namely,
items that do not add to the consumer￿ s utility from the menu, and whose sole function
is therefore to attract consumers￿attention to other items the ￿rm o⁄ers. We analyze
the ￿rms￿trade-o⁄between the cost of adding pure attention grabbers and the bene￿t
of the extra market share they may generate.
The following examples illustrate a variety of contexts in which certain items may
be o⁄ered even if they are rarely consumed, because they attract consumers to the ￿rm
and persuade them to consider other items that are o⁄ered.
Example 0.1. Think of a consumer who wants to buy a new laptop computer. He
initially considers a particular model x, possibly because it is his current machine. The
consumer may then notice that a computer store o⁄ers a model y that is signi￿cantly
lighter than x. This gives the consumer a su¢ cient reason to consider y in addition
to x. Upon closer inspection, the consumer realizes that he does not like y as much
as he does x. However, since he is already inside the store; he may browse the other
laptop computers on o⁄er and ￿nd a model z that he ranks above both x and y. Thus,
although few consumers may actually buy y, this model functions as a ￿door opener￿
that attracts consumers￿serious attention to the other products o⁄ered by the store.1
1One recent example is the launch of Apple￿ s Macbook Air, the thinnest available laptop, measuring
2Example 0.2. Consider the recent strategy of fast-food chains (notably McDonald￿ s
in 2004) of enriching their menus with ￿healthy￿options such as salads and fresh fruit,
in an attempt to appeal to health-conscious customers. One may argue (see Warner
(2006) for a journalistic account) that the motive behind this marketing move is not
so much to generate large direct revenues from the healthy options, but to create a
more health-conscious image that will induce a segment of the consumer population
to consider McDonald￿ s restaurants. Once at the restaurant, these consumers will not
necessarily choose the healthiest items on the menu, and their consumption decision
at the restaurant will involve other motives (such as price, or how ￿lling the meal is).
Example 0.3. The use of attention-grabbing items is often associated with com-
petition among media platforms, such as broadcast television, newspapers or internet
portals. Consider the case of broadcast TV. Viewers have a tendency to adopt a de-
fault channel that serves as a ￿home base￿ . For the competing channel, the challenge
is ￿rst to draw the viewer￿ s attention, and then to convince him to stay with it. The
channel￿ s programming strategy takes this motive into account. For instance, the chan-
nel may wish to introduce sensational shows, or sensational news ￿ ashes, because of
their attention-grabbing value.2 Alternatively, it may wish to air programmes that are
identical or similar to the viewer￿ s favorite shows on his default channel, so that he can
recognize familiar genres while on a channel-￿ ipping cruise.
We propose a theoretical framework that incorporates the strategic use of attention
grabbers into models of market competition. In this paper, we take only a ￿rst step in
this direction, by analyzing a model that focuses exclusively on the above-mentioned
trade-o⁄ between the cost of o⁄ering pure attention grabbers and the indirect gain in
market share that they may generate. In the model, two ￿rms, interpreted as media
platforms as in Example 0.3, simultaneously choose a menu of ￿items￿ (in the TV
example, an item is a programme). It is costly for a ￿rm to add items to its menu.
Each ￿rm aims to maximize (the value of) its market share minus the ￿xed costs
associated with its menu. Firms face a continuum of identical consumers having well-
de￿ned preferences over menus. If consumers are indi⁄erent between a menu M and a
0.76 inches at its thickest point and tapering to just 0.16 inches. These extreme features will most likely
attract the attention of consumers contemplating a switch from Windows-based laptops. However,
such consumers may decide not to switch upon learning that the Macbook air requires an external
DVD drive, or that it only has a single USB port.
2A recent study by the Project of Excellence in Journalism (Rosenstiel et al. (2007)) argues that
￿In reporting their priorities, TV producers and journalists said things like, ￿ People are always drawn
to yellow tape and ￿ ashing lights￿or ￿ urgent stories are the attention grabbers￿ . Others repeated the
familiar mantra, ￿ if it bleeds, it leads￿ .￿
3larger menu M0 that contains M, we say that the items in M0nM are ￿pure attention
grabbers￿ . Our interpretation of this indi⁄erence is that when consumers are endowed
with the menu M0, they do not consume the items in M0nM on a regular basis. We
refer to the smallest subset of M that does not contain pure attention grabbers, as the
set of ￿content items￿ . This subset is assumed to be unique for every menu.
Each consumer is initially assigned to one ￿rm i (each ￿rm initially gets half the
consumers), which is interpreted as his default media provider. The consumer￿ s decision
whether to switch to the competing ￿rm j follows a two-stage procedure. In the
￿rst stage, it is determined whether the consumer will pay attention to j￿ s menu.
Conditional on the consumer￿ s attention being drawn to j￿ s menu, the consumer will
switch if and only if he ￿nds j￿ s menu strictly superior to i￿ s menu, according to his
preferences over menus. Thus, the consumer￿ s choice procedure is biased in favor of
his ￿home base￿ : he switches to another ￿rm only if his attention is drawn to its menu
and he strictly prefers it to his default menu.
The novel element of the model is the attention generation process in the ￿rst stage
of the consumers￿choice procedure. Here we extend a modeling approach presented
in Eliaz and Spiegler (in press). The consumer is endowed with a primitive called a
￿consideration function￿f, which determines whether the consumer will pay attention
to the new menu Mj given that his default menu is Mi. Thus, whether or not the
consumer will consider the new media provider depends on the menus o⁄ered by both
providers. We assume that f is not sensitive to the pure attention grabbers in the
default menu Mi, but f is allowed to be sensitive to the pure attention grabbers in
the new menu Mj. We view the consideration function as an unobservable personal
characteristic of the consumer, analogous to preferences over menus, which in principle
can be elicited (at least partially) from observed choices. The consideration function
captures the ease of attracting the consumer￿ s attention under various circumstances.
The case of a rational consumer is subsumed into the model as a special case, in which
the consumer always considers all available menus and thus always chooses according
to his preferences over menus.
We wish to emphasize that our main objective in this paper is to propose a the-
oretical approach for incorporating competition over consumers￿attention into I.O.
models. We interpret the model in media-market terms for expositional purposes, as
it adds to the concreteness of the presentation. The model itself is very stylized and
should not be mistaken for a descriptively faithful account of real-life media industries.
We sacri￿ce realism in the I.O. dimension in return for greater generality in the novel
dimension of our model, namely the explicit modeling of the way ￿rms￿￿product line￿
4strategies determine consumer attention. We hope to demonstrate the kind of ques-
tions and answers one can obtain with this modeling approach, which we believe can
serve as a platform for more descriptively faithful applications to media markets and
other industries. The following key elements of the market model do seem to ￿t the
media-platform scenario.
(i) The ￿rms￿objective function. For media platforms such as commercial broadcasting
networks, newspapers, content websites or search engines, prices do not play a strategic
role. Because their pro￿t is mostly generated by advertisements, it is directly related
to the amount of tra¢ c they attract.
(ii) Each consumer has a ￿default￿ provider. Consumers of newspapers, broadcast
television and online content tend to exhibit some degree of loyalty to a particular
newspaper, TV network or an internet portal. For example, in a study based on
minute-by-minute television viewing for 1,067 individuals (Meyer and Muthaly (2008)),
the authors conclude that ￿people who watch a lot of television are less likely to switch
frequently between channels.￿As to internet browsing, Bucklin and Sismeiro (2003)
and Zauberman (2003) present evidence that users develop ￿within-site-lock-in￿ .
(iii) The scarcity of consumer attention and the role of content in allocating it. The
need to attract a viewer/reader￿ s attention is best captured by the editorial choices
of headlines and news￿ ashes, as well as the level of sensationalism (e.g., the degree of
violence or obscenity) of television programmes (e.g., the escalating level of extremity
adopted by reality shows such as "Fear factor" or talk shows such as "Jerry Springer").
Of course, these content strategies are partly a response to changing viewers￿tastes,
but we believe it may be insightful to think of them also as a response to changes in
viewers￿attention span.3
The consumer￿ s choice procedure determines the market share that each ￿rm re-
ceives under any pro￿le of menus they o⁄er. This completes the speci￿cation of a
complete-information, simultaneous-move game played between the two ￿rms. If con-
sumers were rational, both ￿rms would o⁄er the smallest menu that maximizes con-
sumers￿utility in Nash equilibrium, thus containing no pure attention grabbers. We
show that under a few mild assumptions on the model￿ s primitives (the ￿rms￿cost
function, consumer preferences, and the consideration function), symmetric Nash equi-
librium departs from this rational-consumer benchmark: the probability that ￿rms
3One arena where sensationalism is intensely used for attention-grabbing purposes is local television
news. According to the Boston Globe (Bennet (2004)), ￿The past two decades have seen a marked
shift in local television news across the country, away from in-depth coverage and towards speed and
spectacle.￿
5o⁄er menus that maximize consumer utility is strictly between zero and one. More-
over, ￿rms employ pure attention grabbers with positive probability.
The analytic heart of the paper focuses on two classes of consideration functions.
We begin in Section 3 with the case in which items can be ordered according to how
well they attract attention. For a menu to attract a consumer￿ s attention, it must
contain an item that is at least as ￿sensational￿as the regularly-consumed items in the
consumer￿ s default menu. We show that in this case of ￿order-based￿consideration,
symmetric Nash equilibria have several strong properties. First, while the equilibrium
outcome departs from the rational-consumer benchmark, ￿rms earn the same pro￿ts
as if consumers had unlimited attention. Second, the only menus that contains pure
attention grabbers in equilibrium are those that maximize consumer utility. Third, the
probability that ￿rms o⁄er such utility-maximizing menus is entirely determined by
the cost of the item with the highest ￿sensation value￿ ; speci￿cally, it is a decreasing
function of this cost. Finally, the most sensational item is employed with positive
probability as a pure attention grabber.
In Section 4 we turn to another class of consideration functions, to which we refer
as ￿similarity-based￿ . Here we assume for simplicity that every menu has only one
content item, e.g. the favorite show on a TV channel. The consumer considers a new
media provider if and only if it o⁄ers an item that is similar to the content item on the
consumer￿ s default menu. For example, Kennedy (2002) analyzes programme introduc-
tions by television networks and compares the payo⁄ to imitative and di⁄erentiated
introductions. His analysis indicates that the networks imitate one another when in-
troducing new programs, and that on average, imitative introductions underperform
in terms of rating relative to di⁄erentiated introductions. The author concludes that
this ￿nding ￿suggests that non-payo⁄-maximizing imitation is common in at least one
industry￿ . We propose to interpret the author￿ s ￿nding as evidence suggesting that
a television programme that imitates a programme aired by another network serves
as an attention grabber and therefore its overall value inheres not only in the direct
demand for it.
We de￿ne similarity in a simple way: items are ordered along the real line (as
in Hotelling￿ s model), such that one item resembles another if it belongs to some
neighborhood of the latter. We show that as in the case of order-based consideration,
￿rms￿pro￿ts in symmetric Nash equilibrium are the same as in the rational-consumer
benchmark. In the extreme case in which one item resembles another if and only if
the two are identical, we provide a complete characterization of symmetric equilibria,
including the probability that each item is o⁄ered as a real content item and as a pure
6attention grabber, and the rate at which consumers switch suppliers in equilibrium.
In both cases of order-based and similarity-based consideration, we see that indus-
try pro￿ts are as if attention were not scarce. Although low-cost, low-quality menus
are o⁄ered in equilibrium, the equilibrium cost of pure attention grabbers turns out
to dissipate whatever excess pro￿ts such menus might enable. Finding general su¢ -
cient and necessary conditions for equilibrium payo⁄s to mimic the unlimited-attention
benchmark is a challenging open problem.
In Section 4, we show that whenever ￿rms earn rational-consumer equilibrium prof-
its, the equilibrium has an important property that relates two aspects of a ￿rm￿ s
strategy: the quality of its menu and whether it contains pure attention grabbers.
Speci￿cally, for every pair of menus M and M0 that are o⁄ered in equilibrium, if con-
sumer attention is drawn from M to M0 only as a result of pure attention grabbers
in M0, then it must be the case that the consumer prefers M0 to M. In other words,
whenever consumers are attracted to consider a new provider, they will also decide to
switch to this provider. This result, referred to as the ￿e⁄ective marketing property￿ ,
extends a similar ￿nding in Eliaz and Spiegler (in press).
Our assumption that all consumers are identical is clearly unrealistic, and its role in
the present paper is to sharpen our understanding of the role of attention grabbing in
a competitive environment. In Section 5 we introduce preference heterogeneity into a
model with order-based consideration. We assume that for every consumer type, every
menu has a single content item. We also assume that the best attention grabber is not
the favorite item for any consumer type. We show that if menu costs are su¢ ciently
small, there is an equilibrium that mimics a particular speci￿cation of the homogenous-
consumers case analyzed in Section 3. Thus, many of the properties derived for the
homogenous-consumers case carry over to the heterogeneous-consumers case.
Related literature
This paper extends Eliaz and Spiegler (in press), where we originally introduced the
idea of a two-stage choice procedure in which consumers ￿rst form a ￿consideration
set￿ , which is a subset of the objectively feasible set of market alternatives, and then
apply preferences to the consideration set.4 In both papers, only the ￿rst stage of the
choice procedure is sensitive to the ￿rms￿marketing strategies. Both papers study
market models in which ￿rms choose which product to o⁄er and how to market it,
aiming to maximize the value of their market share minus the ￿xed costs associated
4The notion of consideration sets originates from the marketing literature, which has long recog-
nized that the consumption decision follows a two-step decision process. For extensive surveys of this
literature, see Alba, Hutchinson and Lynch (1991) and Roberts and Lattin (1997).
7with their strategies. Finally, the two papers have a few themes in common: the ques-
tion of whether competitive marketing brings industry pro￿ts to the rational-consumer
benchmark level, and the question of how the ￿rms￿product design and marketing
strategies are correlated, as captured by the e⁄ective marketing property.
However, there are several substantial di⁄erences between the two papers. First
and foremost, the formalism used here is quite di⁄erent than the one used in Eliaz
and Spiegler (in press). In particular, there are important contrasts in how each paper
models ￿rms￿strategies and the consumers￿choice process. While in Eliaz and Spiegler
(in press) there is an a-priori distinction between product design and marketing strate-
gies, in the present paper the marketing strategies in question, pure attention grabbers,
are themselves products. Thus, two consumers with di⁄erent preferences would have
a di⁄erent partition of a given menu into content items and pure attention grabbers.
This not only adds a technical complication to the model, but also changes the analy-
sis when the consumer population is heterogenous (an extension Eliaz and Spiegler
(in press) do not address). Second, there is the obvious di⁄erence in the marketing
strategies under examination: the use of attention-grabbing products by multi-product
￿rms in the present paper, as opposed to the use of advertising and product display
by single-product ￿rms in Eliaz and Spiegler (in press). Finally, the classes of consid-
eration functions analyzed in the two papers are di⁄erent and lead to very di⁄erent
analysis.
Piccione and Spiegler (2009) study the two-stage procedure in a market model that
incorporates price setting while abstracting from ￿xed costs. In that model, single-
product ￿rms choose the price of their product as well as its ￿price format￿ . Whether
or not the consumer makes a price comparison between the two ￿rms is purely a
function of the ￿rms￿price formats, which captures the complexity of comparing them.
The Piccione-Spiegler speci￿cation of the two-stage procedure and the ￿rms￿objective
function leads to a market model that di⁄ers substantially from this paper.
A choice-theoretic analysis of decision processes that involve consideration set for-
mation is explored in Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) and in Masatlioglu, Nakajima
and Ozbay (2009). The ￿rst paper axiomatizes a more general choice procedure than
ours, in which the consumer iteratively constructs consideration sets starting from
some exogenously given default option. The second paper axiomatizes a two-stage
choice procedure in which ￿rst, the decision-maker employs an ￿attention ￿lter￿ to
shrink the objectively feasible set to a consideration set, and second, he applies his
preferences to the consideration set. Both papers are concerned with eliciting the
parameters of the choice procedures (e.g., the preference orderings and the attention
8￿lter) from observed behavior. As such, these papers complement our own, which deals
with strategic manipulation of consumers￿consideration sets.
Another related strand in the decision-theoretic literature concerns preferences over
menus (e.g., Kreps (1979), Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001)). Indeed, in the concluding section we show that a special case of our model with
order-based consideration can be re-interpreted as an instance of a ￿naive￿multi-selves
model, a re-interpretation with interesting welfare implications.
The pure attention grabbers in our paper constitute a particular form of ￿loss
leaders￿ . Conditional on considering a ￿rm￿ s menu, a consumer is indi⁄erent between
the menu with and without pure attention grabbers. Thus, a pure attention grabber
is costly to o⁄er, yet no consumer will be willing to pay to add it to a menu. The
notion of loss leaders in the literature typically refers to products that are priced below
marginal cost (e.g., see Lal and Matutes (1994)). However, in contrast to pure attention
grabbers, loss leaders are consumed in the long run.5
Finally, this paper joins the theoretical literature on market interactions between
pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms and boundedly rational consumers. Ellison (2006), Armstrong
(2008) and Spiegler (forthcoming) provide general treatments of this growing research
￿eld.
2 A Model
We analyze an idealized model of competition between media platforms. Let X be a
￿nite set of ￿items￿ . A menu is a non-empty subset of X. Let P(X) be the set of
all menus. Two ￿rms compete for a continuum of identical consumers having a well-
de￿ned preference relation % over the set of menus P(X). The preference relation is
non-trivial in the sense that there exist menus M;M0 2 P(X) such that M ￿ M0. The
preference relation is also monotonic in the sense that M ￿ M0 implies M0 % M. We
interpret this as a free disposal property - if a consumer does not like an item he does
not have to consume it. An item is a ￿pure attention grabber￿if its inclusion in the
menu is, in some sense, not necessary for satisfying consumer tastes.
De￿nition 1 A menu M contains a pure attention grabber if there exists M0 ￿ M
such that M0 ￿ M.
5One notable exception is Kamenica (2008), which illustrates a signalling equilibrium in which
there is positive probability that a monopolist produces a high quality product even in a state of
nature where all consumer types strictly prefer other products in the ￿rm￿ s product line.
9We assume that for every menu M, there is a unique subset L(M) ￿ M satisfying
the following property: for every M0 ￿ M for which M0 ￿ M, it must be the case that
L(M) ￿ M0 ￿ M. In other words, L(M) is the unique smallest subset of M that does
not contain pure attention grabbers. This assumption is made for simplicity: it means
that for any menu M, we can unequivocally distinguish between relevant content items
and items that serve for grabbing attention. We interpret L(M) as the set of items
the consumer actually consumes on a regular basis from the menu M. The items in
L(M) are referred to as ￿content items￿and the items in MnL(M) are referred to as
pure attention grabbers. Denote M￿ = L(X).
The two ￿rms play a simultaneous-move game in which they choose menus. A mixed
strategy is a probability distribution ￿ 2 ￿(P(X)). Let S(￿) denote the support of ￿.






This is the probability that ￿ assigns to menus that consumers ￿nd exactly as good as
M (including, of course, M itself).
Each menu carries a ￿xed cost, de￿ned as c(M) =
P
x2M cx, where cx > 0 is the
￿xed cost associated with the item x. The cost structure is identical for both ￿rms.
Each ￿rm aims to maximize the value of its market share minus its costs. We will
normalize the costs to be expressed in terms of market share.
Let us turn to consumer choice. De￿ne a ￿consideration function￿f : X ￿P(X) !
f0;1g. For any pair of menus M;M0, we say that M beats M0 if the following conditions
hold in conjunction: (i) there exists x 2 M such that f(x;L(M0)) = 1; (ii) M ￿
M0. Given a pro￿le of menus (M1;M2), consumers choose according to the following
procedure. Each consumer is initially assigned (with equal probability) to a random
￿rm i = 1;2. This initial assignment represents the consumer￿ s default. The consumer
switches to ￿rm j 6= i if and only if Mj beats Mi.
The interpretation of this choice procedure is as follows. The consumer has a
tendency to stick to his default media provider, and not even consider alternative
providers, because of lack of attention, or due to sheer inertia. The consumer will
consider a new ￿rm only if its menu includes an item that satis￿es a certain criterion
in relation to the items he regularly consumes from the default provider. The existence
of such an item draws the consumer￿ s attention to the new ￿rm. Having considered its
menu, the consumer will switch to it only if he ￿nds it strictly superior (according to
his true underlying preferences) to his default menu.
10The tuple hX;c;%;fi fully de￿nes the simultaneous-move game played between the






2[1 + maxx2Mi f(x;L(Mj))] ￿ c(Mi) if Mi ￿ Mj
1
2[1 ￿ maxx2Mj f(x;L(Mi))] ￿ c(Mi) if Mj ￿ Mi
1
2 ￿ c(Mi) if Mi ￿ Mj
(1)
The following example illustrates how consumer choice may be sensitive to pure
attention grabbers.
Example 1 Let X = fa;bg, and assume fa;bg ￿ fag ￿ fbg, f(b;fbg) = 1, f(a;fbg) =
0. Then, if a consumer is initially assigned to a ￿rm that o⁄ers the menu fbg and the
rival ￿rm o⁄ers the menu fag, the consumer will stick to his default ￿rm. However, if
the rival ￿rm o⁄ers fa;bg, the consumer will switch to the new ￿rm.
We impose the following assumptions on the primitives %;c;f:
(A1) For every M;M0 2 P(X), if M ￿ M0 then c(L(M)) > c(L(M0)).
(A2) For every M 2 P(X) there exists x 2 X such that f(x;M) = 1.
(A3) c(X) < 1
2
Assumption (A1) links the costs of providing a menu with consumer preferences.
When neither M nor M0 contain pure attention grabbers, if consumers prefer M to M0,
then it must be more costly to provide the more desirable menu M. This assumption
enables us to interpret % as a quality ranking. Assumption (A2) means that for any
menu that ￿rm j may o⁄er, there is some item that ￿rm i can include in its menu, which
will attract attention from j￿ s menu to i￿ s menu. Put di⁄erently, ￿rms cannot prevent
consumer attention from being drawn to their rival. The interpretation of (A3) is that
costs are not too high in the sense that when ￿rms share the market equally, each has
an incentive to do ￿whatever it takes￿to win the entire market. Thus, (A2) implies
that it is feasible for a ￿rm to attract the attention of its rival￿ s consumers, while (A3)
implies that it will have an incentive to do so, if this would lead to a su¢ cient increase
in its market share.
The case of a consumer who is rational in the sense of always choosing according to
his true underlying preferences % is captured by a consideration function f satisfying
f(x;M) = 1 for all x 2 X; M 2 P(X). We refer to this case as the ￿rational
11benchmark￿ . In this case, both ￿rms o⁄er the menu M￿ and earn a payo⁄of 1
2 ￿c(M￿)
in Nash equilibrium. This is also the max-min payo⁄under (A2) and (A3). The reason
is as follows. The worst-case scenario for a ￿rm, regardless of its strategy, is that its
rival chooses the universal set X. But the best-reply against X is M￿ because it is the
least costly menu that generates a market share of 1
2 against X.
Consumers do not have to act rationally for the rational-consumer outcome to
emerge in equilibrium, as the following remark observes.
Remark 1 Suppose that M￿ beats every menu M 2 P(X) for which M￿ ￿ M. Then,
both ￿rms o⁄er M￿ with probability one in Nash equilibrium.
We omit the proof, as it is quite conventional. For the rest of the paper, we assume
that the condition for the rational-consumer outcome fails.
(A4) There exists M 2 P(X) such that M￿ ￿ M and yet M￿ does not beat M.
This assumption, combined with (A1), implies that when one ￿rm o⁄ers M￿, its
opponent is able to o⁄er a lower-cost, lower-quality menu M such that consumers￿
attention will not be drawn from M to M￿. Assumptions (A1)-(A4) turn out to imply
that symmetric Nash equilibria are necessarily in mixed strategies, and possess the
following properties.
Proposition 1 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then: (i) ￿￿(M￿) 2
(0;1); (ii) there exists M 2 S(￿) such that M￿ ￿ M.
Proof. (i) Suppose that ￿￿(M￿) = 0. Consider a menu M 2 S(￿) such that M0 % M
for all M0 2 S(￿). Then, M beats no menu in S(￿). Therefore, M generates a market
share of at most 1
2. If a ￿rm deviates from M into X, the deviation is pro￿table. By
(A2), it raises the ￿rm￿ s market share from 1
2 to 1, whereas by (A3), it changes its
cost by c(X) ￿ c(M) < 1
2. Now suppose that ￿￿(M￿) = 1. Since M￿ is the (unique)
least costly menu M such that M ￿ M￿, each ￿rm must o⁄er M￿ with probability
one. By (A1) and (A4), there exists a menu M0 such that M0 is less costly than M￿
and M￿ does not beat M0, it is pro￿table for a ￿rm to deviate into M0. It follows that
￿￿(M￿) 2 (0;1).
(ii) Assume the contrary. By (i), ￿￿(M￿) > 0, hence ￿￿(M￿) = ￿(M￿). Let M1
denote the set of menus in S(￿) that M￿ beats, and let M0 denote the set of menus
12M 2 S(￿) for which M￿ ￿ M yet M￿ does not beat M. If M1 is empty, then M￿
generates a payo⁄ of 1
2 ￿ c(M￿). Let ~ M 2 S(￿) be a %-maximal menu in M0. By
(A1), c(L( ~ M)) < c(M￿). Moreover, by the de￿nition of the beating relation, no menu
in S(￿) beats L( ~ M). Therefore, if a ￿rm deviated into L( ~ M), it would generate a
market share of at least 1
2 while costing less than c(M￿), hence the deviation would be
pro￿table. It follows that M1 is non-empty. Let M￿ denote some %-minimal menu in
M1. Thus, M￿ does not beat any menu in M1.
Suppose that a ￿rm deviates from M￿ into M￿. This deviation is unpro￿table only










￿) + c(M￿) ￿ 0 (2)
Now suppose that a ￿rm deviates from M￿ to X. This deviation is unpro￿table





￿(M) ￿ c(X) + c(M
￿) ￿ 0 (3)




￿ c(X) ￿ c(M￿) < c(X)
a contradiction.
Thus, when the outcome of symmetric Nash equilibrium departs from the rational-
consumer benchmark (in the sense that menus that consumers ￿nd sub-optimal are
o⁄ered with positive probability), the probability that menus that maximize consumer
utility are o⁄ered is positive, and pure attention grabbers are o⁄ered with positive
probability. Since a pure attention grabber is costly to o⁄er and makes no di⁄erence
for consumer welfare, the equilibrium use of pure attention grabbers is socially wasteful.
The rationale for the use of pure attention grabbers is that they exert a positive ex-
ternality on other items on the ￿rm￿ s menu - they attract consumers￿serious attention
to these other items, thus increasing the ￿rm￿ s market share.
Comment: The interpretation of L(M)
For every menu M, the subset L(M) is de￿ned in terms of the preference relation %
over menus - L(M) is the smallest subset of M that is equivalent to M in terms of the
consumer￿ s preferences over menus. At the same time, we interpret L(M) as the set
13of items that the consumer regularly consumes from the menu M. This interpretation
justi￿es the assumption that the consideration function f acts on content items alone:
whether or not consumer attention is drawn away from M should not depend on items
on this menu that are rarely consumed.
Our interpretation of pure attention grabbers allows them to be occasionally viewed
by consumers. However, a consumer would not demand any compensation if they were
removed from the menu. For example, a sensational reality show will constitute a
pure attention grabber if a consumer would refuse to pay a premium to have access
to this programme, even though he might occasionally watch a season ￿nale when the
programme is freely available.
The assumption that f acts on the set of content items L(M) of the default menu
M will play an important role in our analysis. It implies that when a ￿rm considers
adding a pure attention grabber to its menu, it weighs the extra menu cost only against
the bene￿t of attracting consumer attention to the ￿rm. The ￿rm need not worry that
adding the attention grabber might divert attention away from the ￿rm. However, as
far as the results in the next section are concerned, none would change if we assumed
that f acts on the entire default menu.
3 Order-Based Consideration
In this section we analyze in detail a special case of our model. We say that f is an
order-based consideration function if there is a complete and transitive binary relation
R on X, such that f(x;M) = 1 if and only if xRy for all y 2 L(M). An order-
based consideration function captures the idea that items can be ordered according
to their attention grabbing powers. For instance, R can represent the sensation value
of di⁄erent types of news items. In order to attract attention, a competing channel
should broadcast news items that are at least as sensational as anything the consumer
regularly watches on his default channel.
Note that the consideration relation R is re￿ exive - i.e., xRx for all x 2 X. Assume
that R is anti-symmetric, that is, xRy implies y/ Rx whenever x 6= y. For every menu M,
let r(M) denote the R-maximal item in M. Denote x￿ = r(X). By (A1), cx￿ < c(M￿).
By (A4), x￿ = 2 M￿.
Although the consideration function is based on a complete and transitive binary
relation, the consumer￿ s choice between menus is typically inconsistent with maxi-
mization of a utility function over menus, as the beating relation (which is the strict
preference relation over menus revealed by consumer choices) may be intransitive.
14Example 2 Suppose xRyRz and that % satis￿es fz;yg ￿ fx;yg ￿ fyg ￿ fxg: The
menu fz;yg beats the menu fx;yg because L(fx;yg) = fyg and yRy: The menu fx;yg
beats fxg because xRx: However, the menu fz;yg does not beat fxg since xRyRz and
R is anti-symmetric. In addition, the revealed ￿indi⁄erence￿relation over menus may
also be intransitive. To see why, note that fxg does not beat fz;yg because fz;yg ￿ fxg.
We have already seen that fz;yg does not beat fxg: Thus, consumer choices ￿reveal￿
that he is indi⁄erent between fz;yg and fxg. Similarly, fxg does not beat fyg (because
fyg ￿ fxg) and fyg does not beat fxg (because xRy). Thus, consumer choices ￿reveal￿
that he is indi⁄erent between fxg and fyg. However, fz;yg beats fyg; because yRy and
fz;yg ￿ fyg.
If consumers behaved as if they were maximizing some utility function over menus
(which need not coincide with %), then by the assumption that c(X) < 1
2, competitive
forces would push ￿rms to o⁄er the cheapest menu among those that are optimal
according to this revealed preference relation. The fact that consumers choose between
menus in a way that cannot be rationalized is what makes this model non-trivial to
analyze.
Let us illustrate the structure of symmetric Nash equilibria in this model with the
following simple example.
Example 3 (The lowest-quality item is the best attention grabber)
Assume that cx￿ < cx for all x 6= x￿. That is, the item with the highest ￿sensation
value￿is also the cheapest to produce. By (A1), this means that fxg ￿ fx￿g for every
x 6= x￿. In other words, the best attention grabber is also the worst item in terms
of consumer preferences. Thus, there is an extreme tension between the items that
maximize consumer welfare and the items that attract attention the most.
There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this case, where the mixed equilibrium
strategy ￿ is as follows:
￿fx
￿g = 2cx￿ (4)
￿(M





￿) ￿ 2cx￿ (6)
To see why this is an equilibrium, let us write down the payo⁄ that each of the three
15pure strategies generates against ￿. The menu M￿ generates a market share of 1
2
because it does not beat any other menu. The menu fx￿g generates a market share of
1
2 ￿ 1
2￿(M￿ [fx￿g) because it is only beaten by M￿ [fx￿g. The latter menu generates
a market share of 1
2 + 1
2￿(fx￿g) because fx￿g is the only menu that M￿ [ fx￿g beats.
It is easy to see that all three menus generate a payo⁄ of 1
2 ￿ c(M￿) against ￿.
Suppose there exists some menu M outside the support of ￿, which yields a higher
payo⁄ against ￿. Among all the menus that are %-equivalent to M￿, the menu M￿ [
fx￿g is the cheapest except M￿, and in addition it attracts attention away from every
possible default menu. Therefore, it must be the case that M￿ ￿ M, in which case it
follows that M is necessarily beaten by M￿ [ fx￿g. Suppose M beats fx￿g. Since x￿
is the best attention grabber in X, it must be that x￿ 2 M. Therefore,
c(M) = c(Mnfx
￿g) + cx￿ > 2cx￿
The market share that M generates is at most (in the best-case scenario where M￿














It follows that the expected payo⁄from M is strictly lower than 1
2￿c(M￿); the expected
payo⁄ from each pure strategy in ￿. If M does not beat x￿; then the highest market
share it can generate is 1
2 ￿ 1
2￿(M￿ [ fx￿g): But since c(M) > cx￿; this same market
share can be achieved with lower cost by o⁄ering fx￿g. Hence, M cannot generate a
higher expected payo⁄ against ￿ compared with the payo⁄ generated by each menu in
￿, a contradiction. It follows that ￿ is a symmetric equilibrium strategy. In fact, it is
the only symmetric equilibrium, as we will show later.
The following is the main result in this section, which provides a complete charac-
terization of symmetric Nash equilibria in this game.
Proposition 2 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then:
(i) Firms earn the max-min payo⁄ 1
2 ￿ c(M￿).
(ii) If M 2 S(￿) contains a pure attention grabber, then M ￿ M￿.
(iii) ￿￿(M￿) = 1 ￿ 2cx￿.
(iv) ￿(M￿ [ fx￿g) > 0.
The proof relies on two lemmas. The ￿rst lemma establishes that menus equilibrium
never contain more than one pure attention grabber. The second lemma shows that
16the rational-consumer menu M￿ is o⁄ered with positive probability in any symmetric
equilibrium. Moreover, this menu fails to attract attention from any inferior menu that
is o⁄ered in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, every M 2 S(￿)
contains at most one pure attention grabber.
Proof. Assume that M 2 S(￿) contains at least two pure attention grabbers x;y,
where xRy. If a ￿rm deviates from M into Mnfyg, it reduces its cost without changing
its market share, for the following reasons. First, M ￿ Mnfyg by the assumption that
y is a pure attention grabber in M. Second, Mnfyg beats exactly the same menus as
M, because r(Mnfyg) = r(M). Third, Mnfyg is beaten by exactly the same menus
as M, because L(Mnfyg) = L(M).
Lemma 2 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, M￿ 2 S(￿) and
there exists no menu M 2 S(￿) that is beaten by M￿.
Proof. Assume the contrary. De￿ne M￿ = fM 2 S(￿) j M ￿ M￿g. By Proposition
1,
P
M2M￿ ￿(M) = ￿￿(M￿) 2 (0;1). Suppose that M￿ includes a menu M 6= M￿ that
beats no menu in S(￿). Therefore, M generates a market share of 1
2. By the de￿nition
of M￿, c(M) > c(M￿). It follows that M yields a payo⁄ strictly below the max-min
level 1
2 ￿c(M￿), a contradiction. The remaining possibility is that for every M 2 M￿,
there exists ~ M 2 S(￿) such that M beats ~ M. Our task in this proof is to rule out this
possibility.
List the menus in M￿ as follows: M1;:::;MK, K ￿ 1, such that
r(MK)Rr(MK￿1)R￿￿￿Rr(M1)
For every Mk 2M￿, let ~ Mk be one of the %-minimal menus among those that are
members of S(￿) and beaten by Mk. By de￿nition, r(M1)Rx for all x 2 L( ~ M1). By
transitivity of R, it follows that for every k = 2;:::;K, r(Mk)Rx for all x 2 L( ~ M1) -
i.e., ~ M1 is beaten by every menu in M￿.
Assume that ~ M1 beats some M 2 S(￿). That is, r( ~ M1)Rx for every x 2 L(M).
Let us distinguish between two cases. First, suppose that r( ~ M1) 2 L( ~ M1). Then,
r(M1)Rr( ~ M1), and by the transitivity of R, r(M1)Rx for every x 2 L(M), contradicting
the de￿nition of ~ M1 as a %-minimal menu in S(￿) that is beaten by M1. Second,
suppose that r( ~ M1) 2 ~ M1nL( ~ M1) - i.e., that r( ~ M1) is a pure attention grabber in ~ M1.
17By Lemma 1, ~ M1 contains no other pure attention grabbers except r( ~ M1). Note that
it must be the case that r( ~ M1)Rr(M1) and r(M1)/ Rr( ~ M1) - otherwise, M1 would beat
all the menus that ~ M1 beats, thus contradicting the de￿nition of ~ M1. Let B denote
the set of menus in S(￿) that are beaten by ~ M1 and not by L( ~ M1). From the ￿rms￿





￿(M) ￿ cr( ~ M1) ￿ 0
At the same time, from the ￿rms￿decision not to deviate from M1 into a menu that





￿(M) ￿ cr( ~ M1) + cr(M1) ￿ 0
The two inequalities contradict each other.
We have thus established that ~ M1 beats no menu in S(￿), as well as beaten by
every menu in M￿. Suppose that a ￿rm deviates from ~ M1 into M￿ [ fx￿g. Then, the
￿rm increases its market share by at least 1
2￿￿(M￿) + 1
2(1 ￿ ￿￿(M￿)) = 1
2, which by
assumption is strictly higher than the change in the cost. Therefore, the deviation is
pro￿table, a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) This follows immediately from Lemma 2. Since M￿
belongs to S(￿) and beats no menu in S(￿), it generates a market share of 1
2 and
therefore yields a payo⁄ of 1
2 ￿ c(M￿).
(ii) Assume that there exists a menu M 2 S(￿) such that: (i) M￿ ￿ M; and
(ii) L(M) ￿ M . If r(M) 2 L(M), then every menu beats M if and only if it beats
L(M), and every menu is beaten by M if and only if it is beaten by L(M). Since
c(L(M)) < c(M), it is pro￿table for a ￿rm to deviate from M into L(M). It follows
that r(M) = 2 L(M), hence M = L(M)[fr(M)g. Now consider the menu M￿[fr(M)g.
This menu beats every menu M00 2 S(￿) that is beaten by M and not by L(M). In
addition, by construction, the menu M￿[fr(M)g beats M. By Lemma 2, M￿ beats no
menu in S(￿). It follows that the bene￿t from adding r(M) to M￿ in terms of added
market share is strictly higher than the cost of this addition. Therefore, the deviation
is pro￿table, a contradiction.
(iii) Assume that ￿￿(M￿) < 1 ￿ 2cx￿. By Lemma 2, M￿ beats no menu in S(￿).
18Therefore, in order for a deviation into M￿ [ fx￿g to be unpro￿table, it must be that
cx￿ ￿ 1
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(M￿)], a contradiction. Now assume that ￿￿(M￿) > 1 ￿ 2cx￿. By part
(ii) of Proposition 1, there exists M 2 S(￿) such that M ￿ M￿. Let M￿ denote the
set of menus M0 2 S(￿) that M beats. The set M￿ must be non-empty - otherwise,
M generates a payo⁄ below 1
2 ￿ c(M￿), a contradiction. By part (i), M generates a
payo⁄ of 1























Hence, none of these menus M includes x￿. Let M￿￿ be the %-maximal menu among
all menus M for which M￿ ￿ M and x￿ 2 L(M). Thus, M￿￿ is not beaten by any menu
in S(￿): Hence, it achieves a market share of at least 1
2. By (A1), c[L(M￿￿)] < c[L(M￿)].
But this means that M￿￿ generates a payo⁄ higher than 1
2 ￿ c(M￿); in contradiction
to part (i) of the proposition.
(iv) Assume M￿[fx￿g does not belong to S(￿). Then, a ￿rm that deviates to M￿￿;
as de￿ned in the proof of (iii), would earn more than 1
2 ￿ c(M￿); in contradiction to
part (i) of the proposition.
Thus, symmetric Nash equilibria in this model have several strong properties. First,
although the equilibrium outcome departs from the rational-consumer benchmark,
￿rms￿pro￿ts are equal to the max-min level, which, as we saw, coincides with the
rational-consumer benchmark. In other words, industry pro￿ts are in some sense ￿com-
petitive￿ . The use of pure attention grabbers is restricted to menus that consumers ￿nd
optimal. In particular, the R-maximal item x￿ is employed with positive probability
as a pure attention grabber to attract attention to M￿. In contrast, when ￿rms o⁄er
sub-optimal menus, they do not adorn them with pure attention grabbers. Finally, the
probability that sub-optimal menus are o⁄ered is entirely determined by the cost of
the best attention grabber. As this cost goes up, the probability that consumers are
o⁄ered menus that maximize their utility goes down.
On a somewhat speculative note, this result provides a perspective into the ongoing
debate over the sensationalism of broadcast television, particularly over broadcast news
(see Bennet (2007)). Critics in this debate attack popular channels for engaging in
19empty rating-driven sensationalism. Broadcasters typically retort that they ￿give the
public what it wants￿ . Viewed through the prism of Proposition 2, both parties to this
debate are right to some extent. Indeed, media providers use sensationalism as a pure
attention grabbing device that does not directly increase consumer welfare. However,
sensationalism does help giving viewers what they want, because it helps to draw their
attention to a package that maximizes their utility.
Recall that in our discussion of Example 3, we claimed that there exist no symmetric
equilibria apart from the one given there. We can now apply Lemma 1 and Proposition
2 to prove this claim.
Proposition 3 If cx￿ < cx for all x 6= x￿, then (4)-(6) is the unique symmetric equi-
librium strategy.
Proof. Let ￿ be some symmetric equilibrium. By Proposition 2, ￿rms earn the max-
min payo⁄and both M￿ and M￿ [fx￿g are in S(￿). Suppose S(￿) also contains some
M = 2 fM￿;fx￿g;(M￿ [ fx￿g)g. If M 2 S(￿) contains a pure attention grabber, then
by part (ii) of Proposition 2, M ￿ M￿. By Lemma 1, M = M￿ [fyg for some y 2 X.
If y 6= x￿; then M￿[fx￿g achieves at least as high a market share as M but with lower
costs. Hence, M does not contain a pure attention grabber.
Denote by A the set of menus M 2 S(￿)nfM￿;fx￿gg for which L(M) = M. Let
~ M be the %-minimal menu in A. Suppose x￿ = 2 ~ M. Then ~ M does not beat any menu
in S(￿). Let B ￿ A denote the subset of menus in A that beat fx￿g. If B is non-
empty, then every menu in this set must include x￿. By the de￿nition of ~ M; every
menu in B must also beat ~ M. It follows that both ~ M and fx￿g achieve exactly the
same market share, but fx￿g is cheaper. Suppose x￿ 2 ~ M. Then ~ M necessarily beats
x￿; but every menu in S(￿) that beats fx￿g also beats ~ M. Hence, the gain in market
share from playing ~ M instead of fx￿g is 1
2￿(fx￿g). Since ~ M 2 S(￿), it must be that
c( ~ Mnfx￿g) ￿ 1
2￿(fx￿g). Since by assumption, x￿ is the cheapest item, it must be true
that cx￿ < 1
2￿(fx￿g). But by part (iii) of Proposition 2, cx￿ = 1
2[1 ￿ ￿￿(M￿)]. Since
we￿ ve assumed that S(￿) includes ~ M; in addition to M￿, M￿ [ fx￿g and fx￿g, we
conclude that 1￿￿￿(M￿) > ￿(fx￿g); hence cx￿ > 1
2￿(fx￿g), a contradiction. It follows
that ~ M = 2 S(￿); which implies that S(￿) can only include M￿, M￿ [ fx￿g or fx￿g. It
is straightforward to show that S(￿) must include all of these menus. Therefore, the
unique symmetric equilibrium is given by (4)-(6).
Thus, when the tension between the things that maximize consumers￿utility and
the things that maximize their attention is the strongest, the structure of equilibrium
20is extremely simple: each ￿rm o⁄ers either the attention grabber only, the optimal
menu only, or the two combined. When x￿ is not the cheapest alternative, one can
construct equilibria with a more complicated structure.
4 Similarity-Based Consideration
In the previous section, we assumed that items can be ordered according to how well
they attract attention, independently of what they attract attention from. In many
cases, however, an item attracts attention if it is similar to what the consumer regularly
consumes. For instance, think of a TV viewer on a channel-￿ ipping cruise. If he
stumbles upon a familiar show, he may pause and pay more attention to the channel
on which the show is aired.
Likewise, when a channel programs shows that contain features that are familiar to
viewers from their TV habits, viewers are more likely to recall the channel and thus
consider it as an option when thinking about what to watch on TV. Several studies in
psychology and marketing con￿rm this intuition. For example, subjects in Markman
and Gentner (1997) were asked to make similarity comparisons between pairs of pictures
and were then probed for recall. The recall probes were ￿gures taken from the pictures
and were either alignable (related to the commonalities) or nonalignable di⁄erences
between the pairs. The authors show that the alignable di⁄erences were better memory
probes than the nonalignable di⁄erences. Following up on these results, Zhang and
Markman (1998) showed that attributes that di⁄erentiate later entrants from the ￿rst
entrant are better remembered and listed more often in judgment formation protocols
if the attributes are comparable along some common aspect (i.e., they are alignable
di⁄erences) than if they do not correspond to any attributes of the ￿rst entrant (i.e.,
they are nonalignable di⁄erences).
Our model can capture this idea, provided that we interpret the consideration
function f as an object that captures the role of recall in the attention-generation
process. We envision the consumer as trying to recall from memory those menus that
are available to him before making his media consumption decision. The default menu
is easily recalled since the consumer is used to it. However, a new menu may or may
not be recalled, and the consumer will ￿nd it easier to recall it if it contains items that
are similar to what the consumer is already familiar with.
For simplicity, we assume in this section that consumers have max-max preferences
over menus. Formally, let ￿￿ be a linear ordering on X, such that M ￿ M0 if and only
if there exists x 2 M such that x ￿￿ y for all y 2 M0. The interpretation is that every
21menu contains a single item which the consumer regularly consumes. By (A1), x ￿￿ y
if and only if cx > cy. For every menu M, let b(M) denote the ￿￿-maximal item in
M. Thus, for every menu M, L(M) = fb(M)g. Denote y￿ = b(X). Given a mixed
strategy ￿, de￿ne ￿￿(x) =
P
b(M)=x ￿(M) to be the probability that x is o⁄ered as a
￿￿-maximal item in a menu.
To incorporate similarity considerations, we impose some structure on the set of
items. Assume that X ￿ R. For every x 2 X, let I(x) be a neighborhood of x. De￿ne
the following consideration function: f(x;M) = 1 if b(M) 2 I(x). The interpreta-
tion is that consideration sets are constructed according to similarity judgments. For
each product y, there is a set of products that resemble it. The consumer is willing
to consider substitutes to his default if the competing ￿rm o⁄ers some item it resem-
bles. Note that the consideration function induces a re￿ exive binary relation R on
X, de￿ned as follows: yRx if x 2 I(y). This is the similarity relation that underlies
the consideration function. This relation is not necessarily symmetric. That is, it is
possible that x 2 I(y) and yet y = 2 I(x). For evidence that similarity judgments are
not always symmetric, see Tversky (1977). Note that by (A4), there exists x 2 X such
that x = 2 I(y￿). Since M￿ = fy￿g, the max-min payo⁄ is 1
2 ￿ cy￿.6
We now investigate symmetric Nash equilibria under this class of consideration
functions. We begin with an important lemma that relates the probability that an
inferior item is o⁄ered as a content item (i.e., as the ￿￿-maximal item on a menu) to
its cost.
Lemma 3 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, ￿￿(x) ￿ 2cx for all
x 6= y￿.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Let x be the ￿￿-minimal product for which 1
2￿￿(x) > cx.
Suppose that there exists a menu M 2 S(￿) such that b(M) ￿￿ x and y/ Rx for all
y 2 M. Then, M does not beat any menu M0 with b(M0) = x. If a ￿rm deviates
from M to M [ fxg, then since b(M) ￿￿ x, the probability that some menu M00 with
b(M00) ￿￿ b(M) beats M does not change: Therefore, by re￿ exivity of R, the deviation
increases the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ by at least 1
2￿￿(x)￿cx > 0, hence it is pro￿table. It follows
that for every M 2 S(￿) for which b(M) ￿￿ x, there exists some y 2 M such that
yRx, so that M beats any M0 with b(M0) = x.
6Our assumptions do not rule out the possibility that R is complete, transitive and anti-symmetric.
Therefore, the case of order-based consideration is subsumed as special case of the folllowing analysis,
as long as we restrict attention to max-max preferences over menus.
22Now consider a menu M 2 S(￿) with b(M) = x (there must be such a menu, since
by assumption, 1
2￿￿(x) > cx > 0), and suppose that a ￿rm deviates to M [ fy￿g. The




The reason is that ￿rst, M [ fy￿g beats any menu M0 with b(M0) = x; and second,
whereas prior to the deviation every menu M0 2 S(￿) with b(M0) ￿￿ x had beaten M
(as we showed in the previous paragraph), after the deviation no menu beats M [fy￿g.
In order for this deviation to be unpro￿table, we must have 1
2
P
y￿￿x ￿(y) ￿ cy￿. By
the de￿nition of x, 1




y2X ￿(y) ￿ cy￿ +
P
yjx￿￿y cy < c(X). Since the L.H.S of this inequality is by
de￿nition 1
2, we obtain 1
2 ￿ c(X) ￿ 0, contradicting condition (ii).
Lemma 3 implies that ￿￿(y￿) ￿ 1 ￿ 2
P
x6=y￿ cx. That is, the probability that ￿rms
o⁄er the best item has a lower bound that decreases with the cost of inferior products.
This result relies only on the re￿ exivity of R, and thus does not rest on the additional
topological structure we imposed.
Lemma 4 Let ￿ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. For every M 2 S(￿) with
b(M) 6= y￿ there exists M0 2 S(￿) with b(M0) = y￿ such that M0 does not beat M.
Proof. Assume the contrary and let M 2 S(￿) be a menu which is beaten by all
M0 2 S(￿) with b(M0) = y￿. If a ￿rm deviates from M to M [ fy￿g, it increases its
market share by more than 1
2￿￿(y￿). In order for this deviation to be unpro￿table, we
must have ￿￿(y￿) ￿ 2cy￿. Combined with Lemma 3, we obtain
P
x ￿￿(x) ￿ 2c(X).
Since the L.H.S is equal to one, we obtain a contradiction.
Using this lemma, we can now show that in equilibrium, ￿rms cannot sustain a
payo⁄ above the rational-consumer benchmark level.
Proposition 4 Firms earn the max-min payo⁄ 1
2 ￿ cy￿ in any symmetric Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. We begin the proof with some preliminaries. De￿ne M = fM ￿ Xnfy￿g j
M [ fy￿g 2 S(￿)g. Denote B￿(M) = fz 2 X j ￿￿(z) > 0 and z 2 I(x) for some








be the net payo⁄gain from adding the subset M to fy￿g, given that the rival ￿rm plays
￿. Note that in the menu M [ fy￿g, the items in M are all pure attention grabbers.
23The function ￿ is sub-additive: for every M;M0, ￿(M [ M0) ￿ ￿(M) + ￿(M0). For
every M and M0 such that M0 ￿ M, denote ￿(M0;M) = ￿(M) ￿ ￿(MnM0). Thus,
￿(M0;M) is the marginal contribution of M0 to the pro￿t generated by M (when these
sets are combined with y￿). Finally, for every x 2 X, let y￿(x) and y￿(x) be the largest
and smallest elements in X that belong to I(x).
Assume that ￿rms earn a payo⁄ strictly above 1
2 ￿ cy￿ under ￿. By Lemma 4,
￿￿(x) = 0 for all x satisfying y￿Rx and x 6= y￿. By Proposition 1, ￿￿(y￿) > 0.
Therefore, in order for a menu M [ fy￿g 2 S(￿), M 2 M, to generate a payo⁄
above 1
2 ￿ cy￿, it must be the case that ￿(M) > 0. We will show that this leads to a
contradiction with Lemma 4.
Since by Proposition 1, ￿￿(y￿) < 1, M must contain at least two menus - otherwise,
Lemma 4 is trivially violated. For every M 2 M, let m 2 M be the item with the
maximal y￿(x) among the elements x 2 M with ￿(fmg) > 0. Because ￿ is sub-
additive, ￿(M) > 0 implies that there exists x0 2 M such that ￿(fx0g) > 0. If x0
is the item with the highest y￿(x) among all x 2 M; then x0 = m. Otherwise, every
x 2 M with y￿(x) > y￿(m) satis￿es ￿(x) = 0. Order the elements of each M 2








Order the menus M 2 M according to y￿(m), such that M = fM1;:::;MKg,
y￿(m1) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ y￿(mK). We already saw that K ￿ 2. Suppose that y￿(mj) > y￿(mK)
for some j = 1;:::;K ￿1. Then, MK cannot be a best-reply to ￿. The reason is that a
￿rm can deviate to the menu fx
MK
1 ;:::;mK;mjg, and this deviation will be pro￿table.




jMKjg from MK does not a⁄ect
pro￿ts, whereas by construction, ￿(mj) > 0, and B￿fmjg and B￿(fx
MK
1 ;:::;mKg)
are mutually disjoint, and therefore adding mj strictly raises pro￿ts. It follows that
y￿(mj) ￿ y￿(mK) for every j = 1;:::;K ￿ 1. By construction, y￿(mK) ￿ y￿(mj) for
every j = 1;:::;K. Since I(mj) is a real interval for every j = 1;:::;K, it follows that
y￿(mK) 2 B￿(M) for every M 2 M, contradicting Lemma 4. To see why we obtain a
contradiction, note that for MK [ fy￿g to be played in an equilibrium ￿, there must
be some menu ^ M in S(￿); which is beaten by MK [ fy￿g: But then ^ M will be beaten
by any menu that contains y￿; in contradiction to Lemma 4.
Identity-based consideration
An extreme case of similarity-based consideration is when I(x) = fxg for all x 2 X,
such that the similarity relation R is in fact the identity relation: xRy if and only if





to be the probability that an item x is o⁄ered as a pure attention grabber under ￿.
Proposition 5 Suppose that I(x) = fxg for all x 2 X. Then, in any symmetric Nash
equilibrium ￿, ￿￿(x) = 2cx and ￿￿(x) = 2(cy￿ ￿ cx) for all x 6= y￿.
Proof. By Proposition 4, ￿rms earn a payo⁄of 1
2 ￿cy￿ in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Observe that under the identity consideration relation, M beats M0 if and only if
b(M) ￿￿ b(M0) and b(M0) 2 M. Suppose that ￿￿(x) = 0 for some x 6= y￿. Then, if
a ￿rm plays fxg, it earns 1
2 ￿ cx > 1
2 ￿ cy￿, a contradiction. Therefore, ￿￿(x) > 0 for
all x 6= y￿. Let M 2 S(￿) be a menu that includes some x 6= y￿ as a pure attention
grabber. By Lemma 3, ￿￿(x) ￿ 2cx. If the inequality is strict, it is pro￿table for a
￿rm to deviate from M to Mnfxg. It follows that ￿￿(x) = 2cx. But this means that
any menu M 2 S(￿) with b(M) = x, x 6= y￿, yields the same payo⁄ against ￿ as the
singleton fxg. Therefore, 1
2[1￿￿￿(x)]￿cx = 1
2 ￿cy￿, which implies ￿￿(x) = 2cy￿ ￿2cx.
Thus, as an inferior product becomes more costly, it is o⁄ered more often as a
content item and less often as a pure attention grabber. The total probability that any
inferior product is o⁄ered is 2cy￿.
5 The E⁄ective Marketing Property
One of the features of symmetric equilibria under order-based consideration functions
was that pure attention grabbers were o⁄ered only in conjunction with the menu M￿,
which is optimal from the consumers￿point of view. This property does not hold for
general consideration functions. For example, under identity-based consideration (see
the previous section), it is easy to construct equilibria in which menus that are inferior
to M￿ contain pure attention grabbers.
In this section we will see that equilibria in which ￿rms earn rational-consumer
pro￿ts satisfy a weaker property that links the inclusion of pure attention grabbers
in a menu to its quality. This property extends and adapts a similar result (which
goes by the same name) derived in Eliaz and Spiegler (in press) in a di⁄erent market
environment (see our discussion in the Introduction).
25Suppose that a consumer is initially assigned to a ￿rm that o⁄ers an inferior menu
M0, and assume that his attention to the competing ￿rm￿ s menu M is drawn thanks
to a pure attention grabber in M. We show that if M and M0 are drawn from an
equilibrium strategy that induces rational-consumer pro￿ts, it must be the case that
M ￿ M0, hence the consumer will switch away from M0 to M. A priori, the fact that
a pure attention grabber attracts the consumer to consider a menu does not guarantee
that he will choose that menu over his default option. The connection between the two
emerges in equilibrium, as a result of competitive forces.
Proposition 6 (E⁄ective Marketing Property) Suppose that a symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy ￿ induces the max-min payo⁄ 1
2 ￿ c(M￿). Let M and M0 be two
menus in S(￿) which satisfy the following properties: (1) M￿ ￿ M0; (2) f(x;L(M0)) =
1 for some x 2 MnL(M); (3) f(x;L(M0)) = 0 for all x 2 L(M). Then, M ￿ M0.
Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e., there exist menus M;M0 2 S(￿) that satisfy
properties 1-3 above, and yet M ￿ M0. Let B denote the set of menus in S(￿) that
are beaten by M and not by L(M). Note that M0 = 2 B. From the ￿rms￿decision not





￿( ~ M) ￿ c(MnL(M)) ￿ 0
The reason is that when a ￿rm adds a pure attention grabber to a menu it o⁄ers, it
can change only the set of menus that the ￿rm￿ s menu beats, but not the set of menus
that the ￿rm￿ s menu is beaten by.
Now suppose that a ￿rm deviates to the menu M￿ [ (MnL(M)). By assumption,
￿rms earn rational-consumer pro￿ts in equilibrium. Therefore, M￿ does not beat any










0) ￿ c(MnL(M)) ￿ 0
The reason is that adding MnL(M) to M￿ allows a ￿rm to beat not only all the menus
in B, but also the menu M0. However, the two inequalities we derived contradict each
other.
As we saw in Sections 3 and 4, Proposition 6 is not vacuous, because there exist
large classes of consideration functions for which all symmetric Nash equilibria induce
26rational-consumer pro￿ts. In Section 7 we comment on the generality of rational-
consumer equilibrium pro￿ts.
We conclude this section with a demonstration that the e⁄ective marketing property
can be useful in characterizing the rate at which consumers switch ￿rms in equilibrium.
Recall the case of identity-based consideration analyzed in the previous section. Given
the equilibrium characterization of ￿￿(￿) and ￿￿(￿) in Proposition 5, we can calculate
the fraction of consumers who switch a supplier given a symmetric equilibrium strategy
￿. We denote this fraction by ￿(￿). By the e⁄ective marketing property, a consumer
switches from one ￿rm to the other if and only if the highest-quality item on the









Our assumptions on menu costs ensure that ￿(￿) 2 (0;1). Thus, consumers switch
suppliers in equilibrium. By comparison, no switching occurs in the rational-consumer
benchmark. Note that ￿(￿) behaves non-monotonically in menu costs, and approaches
an upper bound of (n￿1)￿c2
y￿ as the costs of all items x 6= y￿ cluster near cy￿=2. The
reason for this non-monotonicity is that as an inferior item becomes more costly to
add, it is o⁄ered less frequently as a pure attention grabber and more frequently as a
content item.
Observe that the switching rate is exactly equal to the equilibrium expected cost of
pure attention grabbers: for each x 6= y￿, the probability x is o⁄ered as a pure attention
grabber by each ￿rm is by de￿nition ￿￿(x), while by Proposition 5, ￿￿(x) is equal to
twice the cost of x. Thus, the general relation between the social cost of pure attention
grabbers and their role in attracting consumers￿attention is especially transparent in
the case of identity-based consideration: the ￿deadweight loss￿associated with pure
attention grabbers is equal to consumers￿switching rate.
6 Heterogeneous Consumer Preferences
In our analysis thus far we have maintained the simplifying assumption that consumers
have identical tastes. This section explores the implications of relaxing this assumption
in the context of order-based consideration.
Partition the grand set X into two subsets, A = fa1;:::;amg and B = fb1;:::;bng.
There are m consumer types, where type i is fully characterized by a preference relation
27￿￿
i, which is a linear ordering on X that ranks ai at the top. The fraction of each type
in the consumer population is 1
m. With respect to menu costs, assume cx = c ￿ 1
2(m+1)
for all x 2 X: The upper bound on costs plays the same role as the 50% bound we
imposed in Section 2, namely it provides a clear ￿rational-consumer benchmark￿and
ensures a certain minimal level of competitiveness.
We begin by characterizing the rational-consumer benchmark for this environment.
We omit the proof for brevity.
Proposition 7 Suppose all consumer types are endowed with the perfect-attention con-
sideration function: f(x;M) = 1 for all x 2 X, M ￿ X. Then, there exists a unique
Nash equilibrium, in which both ￿rms o⁄er A:
In contrast, assume now that all consumer types share an order-based consideration
function as in Section 3. That is, let R be a complete, transitive and anti-symmetric
binary relation on X. For all consumers, the consideration function is as follows:
f(x;M) = 1 if and only if xRy for all y 2 L(M). Thus, while we assume preference
heterogeneity among consumers, we retain the assumption that they are all identical
as far as the attention grabbing process is concerned. For any S ￿ X, let r(S) denote
the R-maximal element in S. Let a￿ ￿ r(A) and b￿ ￿ r(B): Assume r(X) = b￿. That
is, the item with the highest ￿sensation value￿is not a most preferred item for any
consumer type.
It turns out that in this case, there exists a symmetric equilibrium which has similar
features to the symmetric equilibrium when all consumers have identical tastes and
the least-preferred item is also the best attention grabber. In this equilibrium, ￿rms￿
expected payo⁄ is the same as in the rational-consumer benchmark, and the e⁄ective
marketing property continues to hold for all consumer types.
Proposition 8 Under the above speci￿cation of R; the following is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium:
￿(fb
￿g) = 2c (7)
￿(A [ fb
￿g) = 2(m ￿ 1)c (8)
￿(A) = 1 ￿ 2mc (9)
Proof. First, note that by our assumption on the size of costs, the expressions in
(7)-(9) are probabilities. Second, note that each of the menus in the support generates
28an expected payo⁄ of 1
2 ￿ mc: Suppose a ￿rm, say ￿rm 1, deviates to playing A0 [ B0;
where A0 ￿ A and B0 ￿ B: If A0[B0 does no better than A[fb￿g against the proposed
equilibrium ￿, then it cannot do better than any of the other pure strategies in ￿, and
so it is not a pro￿table deviation.
Notice that A0 [ B0 is potentially a pro￿table deviation only if it contains fewer
elements than A[fb￿g does. Let k be the di⁄erence between the cardinality of A[fb￿g
and the cardinality of A0 [ B0. Then k ￿ m. Let k0 ￿ jA ￿ A0j. Then k ￿ k0. We
consider two cases.
Assume b￿ = 2 B0. Then A0 [ B0 does not steal consumers from a ￿rm o⁄ering fb￿g,
while A [ fb￿g does. In addition, any consumer whose favorite item is in A ￿ A0 will
switch from A0[B0 to A[fb￿g. The best scenario that can happen when a ￿rm deviates
to A0 [ B0 is that no consumer leaves the ￿rm when the other ￿rm o⁄ers A. Suppose
this is true. This gives us an upper bound on the expected market share A0 [ B0 can
generate. So the expected gain from this deviation is at most k0c, which is the savings
in costs. The expected loss is 1
2 ￿ 2c, the probability that the consumer starts with the
other ￿rm and the other ￿rm o⁄ers b￿, plus 1
2 ￿ k0
m ￿ 2(m ￿ 1)c, the probability that the
consumer starts with the deviant ￿rm, the consumer￿ s favorite item is in A ￿ A0; and
the other ￿rm o⁄ers A [ fb￿g. Thus, the total expected loss is k0c + (1 ￿ k0
m)c, while
the expected gain is only k0c. So on net, the deviation leads to an expected loss of at
least (1 ￿ k0
m)c > 0.
Assume next that b￿ 2 B0. Then A0 [ B0 steals consumers from the other ￿rm,
when that ￿rm o⁄ers fb￿g: it steals all consumers whose top item is in A0 and may
steal other consumers who rank at least one element in A0 [ B0 above b￿. So at most,
A0 [ B0 steals all consumers who start with b￿. But because B0 does contain b￿ the
deviation saves at most (k0 ￿ 1)c. The expected loss is now at least k0c ￿ (k0
m)c. So on
net, the deviation leads to an expected loss of (1 ￿ k0
m)c > 0.
One may view this result as providing a partial ￿representative agent￿justi￿cation
for the model analyzed in Section 3. In the original model, we assumed consumer
homogeneity but did not force L(M) to be a singleton for all M. In contrast, in the
present section we allow for taste heterogeneity but force L(M) to be a singleton for
all M. Thus, we can interpret consumer choices in Section 3 as the behavior of a
￿representative agent￿relative to a consumer population with a particular distribution
of preferences.
297 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzed a stylized model of market competition that emphasized con-
sumers￿limited attention and the role of the ￿rms￿￿product line￿decisions in ma-
nipulating consumers￿attention. Equilibrium behavior departs from the benchmark of
rational consumers with unlimited attention. Firms o⁄er menus that are inferior to the
consumers￿￿rst-best and employ costly pure attention grabbers in equilibrium. For two
rather classes of attention grabbing processes, industry pro￿ts are exactly the same as
if consumers had unlimited attention: the costly use of pure attention grabbers wears
o⁄ any collusive payo⁄ ￿rms might earn as a result of consumers￿bounded rationality.
This result has an important corollary regarding consumer conversion: whenever con-
sumers￿attention is drawn to a menu thanks to a pure attention grabber it contains,
they end up switching to this menu.
How general are rational-consumer equilibrium pro￿ts?
The following is an example of a consideration function that satis￿es assumptions
(A1)-(A4), and yet gives rise to equilibria that sustain pro￿ts above the rational-
consumer level (this is a variant on an example given in Eliaz and Spiegler (in press)).





k=1 yk, then x ￿￿ y. Assume that the consumers￿
preferences over menus are as follows: M ￿ M0 if and only if there exists x 2 M
such that x ￿￿ y for all y 2 M0. Therefore, M￿ = f(1;1;1)g. Assume further that
f(x;M) = 1 if and only if xk = yk for at least two components k 2 f1;2;3g, where y
is the ￿￿-maximal item in M. This is a similarity-based consideration function in the
same spirit of Section 4, except that the topology over X that de￿nes the similarity
relation is di⁄erent.
One can show that for an appropriately speci￿ed cost function, there is a contin-
uum of symmetric equilibria with the following properties: (i) the support of the equi-
librium strategy consists of f(1;1;1);(1;1;0)g, f(1;1;1);(1;0;1)g, f(1;1;1);(0;0;1)g,
f(1;0;0)g, f(0;1;0)g and f(0;0;1)g; (ii) the equilibrium payo⁄ is strictly above the
rational-consumer (max-min) level of 1
2 ￿c(1;1;1). There is also a symmetric equilibrium
that induces rational-consumer payo⁄s.
How typical is this counter-example? We conjecture that for generic cost functions,
any consideration function that satis￿es (A1)-(A3) induces rational-consumer payo⁄s
in symmetric equilibrium. When (A3) is signi￿cantly strengthened - i.e., when menu
costs are su¢ ciently small - the result holds with no need for a genericity requirement.
The proof of this result is simple and close to a parallel result in Eliaz and Spiegler (in
30press), and therefore omitted.
A comment on welfare analysis
Recall that consumer choice in our model is in general inconsistent with the maximiza-
tion of a utility function over menus. Therefore, welfare analysis in our model cannot
be given a conventional revealed preference justi￿cation. Throughout this paper, we
interpreted % as the consumers￿true preferences over menus, and used it to analyze
consumer welfare. However, there are alternative interpretations of our choice model
that might suggest di⁄erent welfare criteria.
Recall the case of order-based consideration studied in Section 3. Assume that
consumers have max-max preferences over menus (i.e., there is a linear ordering ￿￿
over X such that M ￿ M0 if and only if there exists x 2 M for which x ￿￿ y
for all y 2 M0). This speci￿cation admits an alternative interpretation in the spirit
of the literature on dynamically inconsistent preferences, whereby the rationale that
consumers use to rank menus di⁄ers from the rationale they use when ranking items
within a given menu. According to this interpretation, the binary relation R represents
the preferences over items of the consumer￿ s ￿￿rst-period self￿ , whereas ￿￿ represents
the preference over items of his ￿second-period self￿ . The consumer is naive in the sense
of O￿ Donoghue and Rabin (1999): when he chooses between menus, he erroneously
believes that he will use his ￿rst-period self￿ s preference relation R to choose an item
from menus, whereas in actuality he uses his second-period self￿ s preference relation
￿￿.
When economists study such two-stage, multi-self choice models with naive decision
makers, they often use the ￿rst-period self￿ s preference relation as the normative welfare
criterion, because it tends to represent cool deliberation, whereas the second-period
self￿ s preference relation captures visceral urges that are inconsistent with long-run
well-being. It follows that if we adopted this alternative interpretation of the model,
we would be led to conduct a welfare analysis that replaces ￿ with R as a welfare
criterion. Note, however, that this ambiguity arises in a very special speci￿cation of
our model. At any rate, this discussion demonstrates the subtlety of welfare analysis
in market models with boundedly rational consumers.
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